Loading
FOR TWO NATONATONATONATO NATO NATOEUYour browser does not support the element.years the war in Ukraine has been fought metre by blood-soaked metre. Suddenly, dramatic change is at hand. One reason is that Russia’s grinding advance has exposed grave weaknesses in manpower and morale that could eventually lead to a collapse in Ukraine’s lines. More urgent, Donald Trump has made clear that, as president, he will be impatient for the shooting to stop.The great worry is that Mr Trump will impose a disastrous deal on Ukraine. Vladimir Putin says he might be willing to freeze the front lines, though Russia occupies just 70-80% of four Ukrainian provinces it has annexed. But he is also demanding that the West should lift sanctions; that Ukraine should renounce membership; that it be demilitarised and formally neutral; that it “denazify” itself by jettisoning its leaders; and that it protect the rights of Russian-speakers.Should Mr Trump back this, Mr Putin would have achieved most of his war aims and Ukraine would have suffered a catastrophic defeat. What is more, Russia’s president would not respect a piece of paper. He would hope that post-war Ukraine, consumed by infighting and recriminations against the West, would fall into his lap. If it did not, he might seize more territory by force. As the self-appointed guardian of Ukraine’s Russian-speakers, he could easily concoct a pretext.That is the fear. But it is not inevitable, nor even the likeliest outcome. Capitulation to Mr Putin would be a public defeat for America and Mr Trump. It would spill over into Asia, where America’s foes might become more aggressive and its friends might lose confidence in their ally and curry favour with China instead. And Mr Trump would surely want to avoid the humiliation of being known as the man who lost Ukraine by being out-negotiated by Mr Putin. It is in his own narrow interest to forge a deal that keeps Ukraine safe for at least the four years of his term. In that time Ukraine can accomplish a lot.Mr Trump has leverage over Russia if he wants to use it. Because he is unpredictable, he could threaten to go all-in with Ukraine by sending it more and deadlier weapons, and Mr Putin would have to take him seriously. In addition, , the rouble is tumbling and Russians are tired of fighting. Although Mr Putin could sustain the war for another year or more, he might also benefit from a pause. As Mike Waltz, Mr Trump’s incoming national security adviser, has suggested, America can therefore also threaten to use sanctions to make that pain worse.What, then, should a deal aim for? Restoring the borders of 1991 is a pipe dream. Morally and legally, all that land belongs to Ukraine, but it does not have the soldiers, arms or ammunition to recapture it. Instead, the aim should be to create the conditions for Ukraine to thrive in the territory it now controls.For that it will require stability and reconstruction, both of which depend on being safe from Russian aggression. That is why at the heart of the talks will be how to devise a credible and durable framework for Ukrainian security.has argued that the best way of protecting Ukraine would be for it to join . Membership would help prevent it from becoming unstable, embittered and vulnerable to co-option by Mr Putin in pursuit of his ultimate aim, which is to destabilise and dominate Europe. It would also bring Europe’s largest, most innovative and battle-hardened army and defence industry into the alliance—something that Mr Trump might welcome, because would then need fewer American troops.Membership raises hard questions, because of the alliance’s “Article 5” pledge that an attack on one member is an attack on all. But answers exist. The guarantee need not cover the parts of Ukraine that Russia now occupies—just as it did not cover East Germany when West Germany joined in 1955. Troops from other countries may not need to be based in Ukraine in peacetime, as when Norway joined in 1949.We still favour these arguments. However, for Ukraine to be in requires the backing of all its 32 members, including Hungary and Turkey, which delayed the accession of Sweden and Finland. As , some countries, including the front-line states, plus Britain, France and, under a new chancellor, Germany, may therefore be open to bilateral deals in which they base their troops in Ukraine as a tripwire force . In effect, they would be seeking to deter Mr Putin with the threat that further Russian action could bring them into the war.It looks like an elegant solution, but a tripwire force would amount to an Article 5 guarantee by another name. Countries should not offer such a promise to Ukraine unless they are ready to honour it—as walking away under Russian fire would undermine them as members of , too, perhaps fatally. Simply because it was new, the tripwire force would be likely to be probed and tested for weak points by Mr Putin. To be credible it would need formal backing from Mr Trump, even if he provided no troops, because Europe still depends on America to fight wars, especially against an adversary as big as Russia.It would also need a change of approach in Europe, particularly in Germany. To signal to Mr Putin that they were serious, European countries would need to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. That would involve massive aid for rebuilding the country and weapons, as well as progress in accession talks. To signal to Mr Putin that they would fight back if he attacked, they would need to dramatically and overhaul their arms industries . Mr Trump, who has long urged bigger European defence budgets, ought to welcome such an outcome.A ceasefire would present two competing visions of Ukraine’s future. Mr Putin’s calculation is that he will win from a deal because Ukraine will rot, Russia will re-arm and the West will lose interest. But imagine that, with Western backing, Ukraine used the lull to rebuild its economy, refresh its politics and deter Russia from aggression. The task is to ensure that this vision prevails over its grim alternative.
