Syrian rebels have dealt a blow to Vladimir Putin’s naval ambitions

FOR 50 YEARSNATOHTSNATO NATOSWPCAST Russia’s foothold in the Mediterranean has been bound up with the Assad dynasty in Syria. It was in 1971 that Hafez al-Assad—father of Bashar, Syria’s dictator until last week—became president of the country. And it was the same year that the Soviet Union signed a deal with Syria to lease a port at Tartus on Syria’s coast. That enduring Russian military presence now hangs by a thread, following the . The Kremlin appears to have avoided a panicked and disorderly departure, but its influence on ’s southern flank is likely to wane.For Russia, Syria was an important partner long before its civil war broke it into pieces. “This base is essential to us,” declared Viktor Chirkov, Russia’s then navy commander, in 2012. “It has been operating and will continue to operate.” Russia’s footprint in Syria expanded dramatically in 2015, when it intervened to save Mr Assad’s regime from advancing rebels. It sent jets to the Khmeimim air base, further north in Latakia, from which it pulverised rebels, and naval forces to Tartus, which had largely fallen into disuse in the 1990s. Tartus has not yet been evacuated, though as of December 9th Russian warships were lingering around 8km west of the port, well away from danger, according to satellite images analysed by MT Anderson, a ship-watcher on X. (Separately, the Israeli navy said on December 10th it had earlier used anti-ship missiles to destroy Syrian warships around Minet el-Beida bay and Latakia port.)A spokesman for the Kremlin said that Russia had taken “necessary steps to establish contact in Syria with those capable of ensuring the security of military bases”. One of those steps appeared to be a more emollient tone to the people that Russia once bombed: Russian media have hurriedly switched from describing rebels as “terrorists” to the “armed opposition”. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (), the , “has been pragmatic in its tone and seems to be keeping its engagement options open,” says Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank. It is possible that the group would allow Russia to keep the base in exchange for arms, diplomatic support or some other quid pro quo. What is more likely is that any deal will be a temporary arrangement. Russia is “negotiating the terms”, says Mr Kofman, but is on the way out. “One way or another, Moscow will likely have to abandon its bases in Syria.”If Russia is eventually given its marching orders, this would have a major impact on its naval posture. Russia’s presence in Tartus has been modest, notes Frederik Van Lokeren, a former Belgian naval officer—a handful of submarines, frigates and corvettes—but those ships have carried long-range missiles, capable of striking targets in southern Europe, and the port has served as a springboard for Russian naval power in an area, the eastern Mediterranean, where forces have tended to have a minimal presence. Russia was able to dispatch larger flotillas south in the knowledge that they would be able to rest, refit and refuel en route. Tartus became especially important as a logistical hub after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Turkey restricted access to the Black Sea and Russia’s fleet there.Without Tartus, Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean are likely to become shorter, more expensive and more sporadic. There are few attractive substitutes. Algeria and Egypt, two alternative hosts, are unlikely to embrace Russian forces, notes Mr Van Lokeren, for fear of the geopolitical fallout. Russia has been in talks with Sudan over building a naval facility there, but Port Sudan lacks the necessary infrastructure. Russia might therefore look to Tobruk in Libya, he suggests. The port is controlled by Khalifa Haftar, a Libyan warlord who has long maintained close ties with Russia, and has welcomed its ships in the past, including a cruiser and a frigate as recently as this summer. But without the development of onshore infrastructure, these anchorages are likely to be a pale shadow of Tartus.The loss of Khmeimim would also be a blow, though a lesser one. The air base has been an important hub for Russian air power. It is “perfectly placed” between Russia and Africa to allow Russia to supply mercenary forces in Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali, notes John Foreman, Britain’s former defence attaché in Moscow. In 2017 Syria granted Russia a 49-year lease on the base, and its runways were expanded to accommodate larger aircraft. That also allowed it to be used as a springboard for Russian strategic bombers, which were used to simulate anti-ship missile runs against Britain’s aircraft-carrier strike group in the Mediterranean in 2021, notes Mr Foreman. But the Syrian base would be relatively easy to replace. Russia still has three alternative air bases it can use in Libya, argues Mr Kofman, who adds that personnel and equipment appear to be leaving Khmeimim already.Nine years ago, Russia’s intervention in Syria marked its resurgence as a major military power beyond Europe. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, fresh from invading eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea the previous year, swooped in to save his ally with a decisive show of air power thousands of miles from home. The events of the past week mark a sharp reversal in fortunes. Mr Assad’s fall “is a major blow to Putin’s dream of Russia as a global player in a multipolar, post-Western world,” writes Sabine Fischer of the think-tank in Berlin.Many influential Russians appear to have reached much the same conclusion. The new rulers of Syria “create the impression of being rational and civilised”, wrote Fyodor Lukyanov, an analyst close to the Kremlin, adding that Russia’s “absolute priority” was Ukraine. Russia, he concluded, was better off being a regional power, focused on Europe. “Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority to intervene effectively by force outside the former Soviet Union,” agreed Ruslan Pukhov, an expert at the think-tank in Moscow with close ties to the defence establishment. Russia had won fast, but failed to consolidate its victory politically. “The Americans have been through this before in Iraq and Afghanistan,” wrote Mr Pukhov, “but the Russians, by our national tradition, must necessarily step on the same rake themselves.”